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Collection Experience
The question treated in this and the next chapter is whether the ulti-
mate collection experience with aparticular group of instalment
credit contracts (though not the ultimate experience on any single con-
tract) can be approximately determined at the time the credit is ad-
vanced. If a favorable answer can be given, it should be possible to
establish whether, for many lenders or for the country as a whole,
loan quality is deteriorating or improving to a significant extent at any
given time. It should also be possible to establish whether loan quality
is related to changes in loan volume, as well as to other objective
factors in the consumer credit situation.
The existence and significance of such relationships, of course, re-
main to be established. At this point we wish merely to inquire whether
the lender is able to predict to some degree the ultimate experience
with a group of loans meeting certain standards with respect to loan
terms or borrower characteristics.
We must state at once, however, that an affirmative answer to this
question does not necessarily imply that the actual experience with a
given group of loans is closely predictable. This actual experience
may depend importantly on the character of the business situation that
develops while the loans are outstanding, as well as on other develop-
ments affecting the borrowers' ability to repay. 'What we are seeking
to answer is whether, given the character of the future situation, the
experience with one group of loans is likely to be better than with
another and by how much. If the future situation is prosperous, ex-
perience may be favorable with all groups, though relatively less with
some than others; if a depression comes along, experience may be un-
favorable with all groups, but again relatively less so with some thanCredit Terms and Coflection Experience 57
others. Can this relative experience be determined approximately in
advance?
It is not intended here to discuss at length the process whereby
credit standards are determined by individual lenders and loans are
actually made. Nevertheless, it is important to touch upon the thinking
involved in lending and fixing loan standards in order to explain the
empirical evidence that follows. To begin with, it is self-evident that
loans are screened in some fashion to assure the lender that the loan is
being sought in good faith with every intention of repayment. Thus, a
substantial proportion of every credit investigation is devoted to veri-
fying the honesty of would-be borrowers with respect to their business
dealings. Beyond these minimum requirements for the prevention of
fraud, however, lenders must satisfy themselves as to the present and
future ability of the borrower to repay the loan, the likelihood that the
borrower will remain willing to repay, and the adequacy of collateral
or legal remedies in the event that the borrower does not repay. Lend-
ers have for years summarized this by saying that lending standards
are based upon the "character, capacity, and collateral" of the bor-
rower. The borrower's income, his previous commitments, the stability
of his occupation, and whether he is at a station in life in which the
desire and social pressure to repay the debt are paramount—all these
factors may be considered. Often, however, judgments must be based
on rather sketchy evidence and analysis.
The fixing of credit standards rests in part on certain general lines of
reasoning. Obviously the risk of default is greater the smaller the
borrower's equity and the longer the time for repayment, since a
longer period may encompass more drastic changes in ability to repay.
Obviously, persons in occupations with regular and predictable income
tend to be better risks than those in occupations with variable and
unpredictable incomes. Less obvious but still amenable to logical analy-
sis is the tendency for the lender's risk on a loan for a durable good to
increase as maturities are lengthened and down payments reduced, be-
cause the market value of a consumer durable depreciates more rapidly
in the earlier than in the later part of its life. Out of such considera-
tions are forged the credit standards of individual lenders, modified,
of course, by competitive pressures, by actual loss and recovery ex-
perience, by changing evaluations of risk, and by changing opportuni-
ties to recoup losses from finance charges or to shift risks to others.58 Qualityof Consumer Instalment Credit
In considering the evidence on loan experience, it is again necessary
to take into consideration the fact that the statistical record is based on
loans that have already been subjected to lender selection. All the loans
making up the experience have already been screened for moral risk,
terms have normally been adjusted to make repayment possible within
the scope of the purchaser's budget, and unusual risks in one direction
may have been balanced by more strict loan or collateral conditions
in another direction. Preselection of loans and tailoring to counter-
balance unusual risks with stricter conditions accordingly are re-
flected in the experience statistics.
It is important to note also that only rarely is the avoidance of loan
losses and collection difficulties the prime determinant of lending stand-
ards. While each lender differs somewhat in what he regards as his
policy, those who try to maximize their net revenue generally will
lend to a given class of borrowers if the anticipated return at least
covers the additional expense of the loan including collection difficul-
ties and the additional expected losses to be incurred by accepting
poorer quality loans. In some circumstances individual lenders will
accept poorer quality credit risks at a higher schedule of finance
charges. For example, most lenders accept loans secured by used cars
at higher interest rates than on loans on new cars. Moreover, for the
economy as a whole, an informal structure of lending institutions
exists, with some firms taking mostly prime quality consumer paper,
others taking less attractive loans at higher rates, and still others lend-
ing to extremely poor risks at high and sometimes illegal rates of
interest. Accordingly, quality changes may take place not only through
shiftsin the individual lender's loan standards but also through
shifts in the volume of business done by financing institutions with
differing standards.
There is a great deal of scattered (and frequently unsatisfactory or
unreliable) material which purports to relate collection difficulty or
loss to the terms of the loan, the characteristics of the borrower, and
even the type and condition of the collateral. While its examination
here is neither complete nor definitive, we attempt to view these rela-
tions in more consistent fashion than has heretofore been possible.
We have chosen to use two convenient methods of quantifying loan
experience as a measure of loan quality. The first method, that of
calculating delinquency, repossession, or loss rates, involves computingCredit Terms and Collection Experience 59
for each category of loan—say those on which the down payment was
less than one-third—the percentage that loans with collection difficulty
or loss constituted of total outstandings or volume per period in that
same category. The second method, that of computing "bad loan rela-
tives," requires that the percentage a particular category of loans makes
up of total bad loans (loans on which collection difficulty or loss is
sustained) be divided by the percentage that this same category makes
up of total good loans. If, for example, 40 per cent of the bad loans were
in the group on which a down payment of less than one-third had
been obtained, whereas among the good loans only 20 per cent were
in this low down payment category, the bad-loan relative would be
40/20 =2.0.It would indicate that the actual bad-loan rate (derived by
the first method) on low-down-payment loans would be about twice
as high as the average rate on all loans.' Occasionally, we shall use the
percentage distribution of all loans, instead of good loans, for the de-
nominator of the bad-loan relative. This makes the bad-loan relative a
precise index of the actual bad-loan rate when the samples of good
and bad loans are in proper proportions, but in practice the two var-
iants of bad-loan relatives yield similar results. The relation between
the first measure and the two variants of the second is shown by the
following hypothetical example:
Down Payment Percentage
Under 3333 per centTotal or
item per cent and overAverage
Number of loans:
1. Repossessed 1,000 1,500 2,500
2. Not repossessed 9,000 38,500 47,500
3. Total 10,000 40,000 50,000
Percentage distribution of loans:
4. Repossessed 40 60 100
5. Not repossessed 19 81 100
6. Total 20 80 100
Repossession rate (method 1):
7. Line 1 ± line 3 10.00 3.75 5.00
Bad-loan relatives (method 2):
8. Line 4 ÷ line 5 2.11 0.74 1.00
9. Line 4 ± line 6 (or line 7 ± Co1. 3) 2.00 0.75 1.00
1Thesecond method does not require information on the actual proportion
of bad loans, and provides only an index of the way this proportion varies
among categories. The advantage of this method for studies of loan experience60 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
If we are to utilize the several available samples, we cannot adopt a
uniform definition of a bad loan or unfavorable collection experience.
Several spurces provide repossession rates, one covers repossession as
well as other forms of delinquency, others give actual loss rates or
loans charged off, and one allows the lender to define unfavorable
collection experience.2 It is conceivable, accordingly, that inconsistent
results will appear if loans of a given class result in a great deal of
delinquency but little dollar loss because of the ultimate collection of
most of the funds in question. For the purpose of extending the avail-
able data, some experience on unsecured loans has been included even
though these types of loans are ordinarily not used for the purchase
of durable goods, the type of transaction upon which this report is
focused.
A final shortcoming of most of the available data must be men-
tioned. With rare exceptions the loan experience samples are classified
by only one criterion at a time. That is, they show the experience on
loans with less than one-third down payment, or on loans with a term
of more than thirty months, but not on loans with less than one-third
down and a term of more than thirty months. The evidence dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 showed, however, that the several characteristics
by which loans are classified are associated with one another—e.g.,
long maturities and low down payments often go together. As a re-
sult, it is difficult to determine to what extent differenc'es in loan ex-
perience are associated with the particular characteristic being ob-
served rather than with some other one that is tied to it. In some cases
the influence of the other factor or factors may completely obscure
that of the characteristic underlying the given distribution. We shall
illustrate some important instances of this sort below, but the possi-
bility of effects of this sort should be kept in mind throughout.
In reviewing the evidence on the relation between the terms on
which loans are made (primarily the size of the down payment and
the length of time the loan contract has to run) and the subsequent
isthatitpermits oversamplirig of bad loans, which ordinarily occur infre-
quently, thereby reducing sampling variability and increasing the firmness of con-
clusions concerning the characteristics differentiating good and bad loans.
2Theanalytical advantages and disadvantages of four major measures of col-
lection difficulty are discussed in Appendix C. One of these, renegotiations of
loans with an extension of the repayment period, has not been included in our
bad-loan category because such extensions are ambiguous—they can reflect credit
difficulty or simply the desire to free funds for further purchases. Moreover, few
data are available on loan extensions.Credit Terms and Collection Experience 61
collection experience, we shall first deal briefly with the various anal-
yses of this material that have appeared since the 1920's. Next we shall
consider new data that have been developed from the Federal Reserve
Survey of New Car Purchases in 1954—55. Finally, we shall analyze
certain new data on loan terms and collection experience in different
sections of the country.
CONSPECTTJS OF EVIDENCE
FROM THE 1920's TO THE 1950's
The several analyses of the relations between loan terms and subse-
quent collection experience developed by previous investigators en-
able us to consider separately the relation of down payments and of
maturities to collection experience for a number of periods scattered
over a thirty-year span.
Table 24 presents the earliest data we have found bearing on the
relation of down payment percentages and collection experience. It
shows clearly that in the earlier history of automobile instalment credit,
repossession rates were consistently higher for loans with a small down
payment than for those with a substantial down payment in terms of
percentage of purchase price.
This relation has not changed markedly from the 1920's to recent
years. All the evidence in Chart 7 and Table 25, as well as in Table 28
in the next section, shows that repossession and loss rates are higher,
on the average, when the down payment is small than when it is large.
This is true of used cars as well as new cars, although collection ex-
perience with a given down payment percentage is materially worse
for used than for new cars. Since the data are so varied and the
samples so limited, it is not possible to make precise comparisons. For
example, the practice of "writing up" both the trade-in and the pur-
chase price of the new car and thereby raising the down payment
percentage, a practice that probably became more prevalent in the
1950's than formerly, makes doubtful the precise comparability of the
figures, both within a given sample and from year to year.3
To avoid some of these problems the Federal Reserve Board in 1956 began
collecting data on contract balance as a percentage of dealer cost, a type of
loan-to-value ratio, thereby avoiding the problem of defining the "true down
payment" altogether. Although this "dealer cost ratio" is analytically more pre-
cise, its introduction has had the unfortunate effect of making comparisons with
earlier data on down payment percentage virtually impossible.62 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
TABLE 24
The Relation of Down Payment Percentage to Repossession Rate,







Under 25 per cent11.011.5n.a.n.a.n.a.n.à.120a
25 per cent 3.84.05.94.15.14.6 4.6
33 1/3 per cent 1.72.12.72.82.83.6 2.6
Used cars:
35 per cent or less6.28.66.910.99.09.8 8.6
40 per cent 3.04.35.25.35.36.5 4.9
Source: "Composite Experience of Finance Companies and Automo-
bile Dealers," a mimeograph statement of the National Association of
Finance Companies, April 13, 1931.
aEstimated by raising the 1925—26 average by 0.7 percentage
points, which is the excess of the 1925—30 average over the 1925—26
average for the other two down-payment classes.
n.a. =notavailable.
Evidence from one large sales finance company that repossession
rates are lower the lower the dealer cost ratio on new cars and the
lower the percentage of wholesale value financed on used cars is given
for 1958 and 1959 in Paul W. McCracken, James C. T. Mao, and
Cedric V. Fricke, Consumer Instalment Credit and Public Policy,
Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966, p.138. For more comprehensive but in-
direct evidence, see our analysis of the dealer cost ratio in Chapter 7
and Appendix H. As noted below, even though the down payment
percentage is an imperfect measure of borrowers' equity, every study
of it has shown it to be closely associated with loan experience.
The relation between loan experience and the length of time given
for repayment seems to be more complicated. The earliest evidence
bearing on this, pertaining as before to 1925—30, suggests that theCHART 7
The Relation of Down Payment Percentage to Subsequent
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New York, NBER, 1941, Table 9, p. 61. (2) G. A. Ames, "Our Responsibility to
Consumer Credit," talk given at the National Instalment Credit Conference, spon-
sored by the American Bankers Association, Chicago, March 25,1953.(3) See
Table D-1. Unpublished lender report data from National Analysts Survey of New
Car Purchases for Federal Reserve Board, 1954—55. (4) E. F. Wonderlic, "Control
of Losses in Instalment Credit," Time Sales Financing, February 1956. (5) Wilbur
C. Plummer and Ralph A. Young, Sales Finance Companies and Their Credit Prac-
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TABLE 25
Bad-Loan Relatives by Down Payment Percentage, Based on
Repos sessions, Automobile Contracts, 1954—56
Down Payment
Percentage • Jan. 1954
Bad-Loan Relativea
Jan. 1955 Jan. 1956
New cars:
Under 33 per cent 3.3 2.5 2.2
33—40 per cent 1.6 1.3 1.0
Over 40 per cent 0.2 0.2 0.2
Used cars:
Under 33 per cent 1.4 1.4 1.3
33—40 per cent 1.2 1.1 1. 1
Over 40 per cent 0.4 0.5 0.5
Source: A large sales finance company, NBER Consumer Credit
Quality Study.
aComputed by dividing the percentage distribution of repossessions
in January by the corresponding percentage distribution of all accounts
purchased during the preceding calendar year.
losses on loans with longer maturities were higher (Table 26). More
recent evidence is shown in Chart 8 and Table 27. These materials
indicate some of the complications which ensue from a consideration of
maturities. Chart 8 shows bad-loan relatives and repossession and loss
rates for various samples ranging from signature loans to automobile
loans. Each of the samples pertaining to loans on new cars and ap-
pliances shows that collection difficulties increase as the maturity of the
contract is lengthened. On the other hand, the loans on used cars
exhibit more favorable experience on the longer maturities, and the
evidence on personal or unsecured loans is mixed.4
Interviews with lenders suggest that the reason for the poor ex-
Some further evidence on maturities in relation to loan experience which
broadly supports the above results for new and used cars and personal loans
is presented for 1958-59 by McCracken, Mao, and Fricke, Consumer Instalment
Credit, p. 139, and for 1952—58 by Paul Smith, "Measuring Risk on Instalment
Credit," Management Science, November 1964.Credit Terms and Collection Experience 65
TABLE 26
The Relation of Loan Maturity and Repossession Losses,
Automobile Contracts, 1925—30
Length of Contract 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Average Direct Loss Per Repossessed Car,
In Dollars
12 or fewer equal
monthly payments 50 65 43 56 60 61
13 to 18 equal
monthly payments 78 94 58 75 n.a. n.a.
Over 18 monthly
payments or
balloon note 220 158 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: "Composite Experience of Finance Companies and Auto-
mobile Dealers," a mimeographed statement of the National Associa-
tion of Finance Companies, April 13, 1931.
n.a. Not available.
perience on used-car loans of extremely short maturities is that the
short-maturity loans are generally on the cheapest cars, purchased
usually by the poorest credit risks. This is to some extent borne out by
Durand's findings, which indicated very little difference in collection
experience on new cars of different price ranges up to $1,500 (1938
price levels), but that the incidence of collection difficulty for used
cars selling for under $200 was about three times that for cars seffing
for over $600. In order to establish the point definitely, however, loans
should be cross-classified by maturity, selling price, down payment
percentages, and so on. An experiment of this sort has been made with
the limited data available and is considered below.
THE 1954—55 SURVEY OF NEW-CAR PURCHASES
The results described above can now be supplemented by special tabu-
lations from the Federal Reserve survey of new-car purchases in66 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
CHART 8
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SouRcic: (1) Risk Elements, Table 6, p. 54. (2) Ames, "Our Responsibility to
Consumer Credit."(3) See Table D-4. Unpublished lender report data from
National Analysts Survey of New Car Purchases for Federal Reserve Board, 1954—
55.(4) WTonderlic, "Control of Losses in Instalment Credit."(5) Plumnier and
Young, Sales Finance Companies, Table 47, P. 186. (6) W. David Robbins, Con-
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TABLE 27
Bad-Loan Relatives by Length of Contract, Based on Re possessions
























l2orless 1.3 1.3 1.3
13—18 1.0 .9 1.0
19—24 .6 .6 •.6
Over 24 1.0 .8 .7
Source: NBER Consumer Credit Quality Study.
aComputed by dividing the percentage distribution of repossessions
in January by the corresponding percentage distribution of all accounts
purchased during the preceding calendar year.
1954—55. Two independent tests of the relation between down pay-
ment ratio and subsequent collection experience, as measured by de-
linquency and repossession rates, are shown in Table 28, cols.3 and
5—one using data from lender reports; the other, personal interviews
of borrowers.6 According to the lender report data, with the exception
Some of the tabulations were made for the National Bureau of Economic
Research by National Analysts, Inc., the concern that conducted the survey. For
others we are indebted to the Division of Research and Statistics of the Federal
Reserve Board. The tabulations are based on what was termed the "replicated
sample" of loans, as explained in the Appendix to Part IV of Consumer In-
stalment Credit. Briefly, the individual loan cards were replicated to allow for
changes in the ratio of the sample (550 loans every month) to total loan volume
(which, of course, varied) and also for nonresponse items. The replication rate
was 1.9; that is, the replicated number of loans was nearly twice the actual
number.
°Thisimportant feature of the survey not only permitted validation of the
findings from both the lender and the borrower but also provided information
from the borrower that the lender did not have and vice versa. Many of the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.70 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
of the smallest down payment group, the repossession and delinquency
rate falls steadily as the contract down payment ratio increases. The
personal interview data (col. 5) present a similar though weaker pat-
tern.7
In both cases it is clear that loans on which the contract down pay-
ment ratio fell below 35 per cent had markedly inferior collection ex-
perience. The broad relationships are similar despite the fact that the
frequency of collection difficulty disclosed by personal interview was
substantially less than that repor,ted by lenders.
The Federal Reserve survey adopted a special method for handling
the difficult problem mentioned above of estimating the degree to
which stated down payment percentages are altered by the large varia-
tion in trade-in allowances given on new-automobile instalment con-
tracts. The method, which involved an effort by the interviewers them-
selves to estimate the degree of overallowance on trade-ins, is ad-
mittedly subject to considerable error.8 Both the size of the contract
because the lender reports included few questions on borrower characteristics.
For a detailed account of the survey method, definitions, and sampling procedure
see Volume VI of the Federal Reserve Board's report.
In Table 28 and subsequent text tables the number of loans reported de-
linquent and the number on which repossession had occurred are combined to
produce a bad-loan rate. The separate data for the two categories, which are
given in Appendix D, provide more information by distinguishing a more serious
from a less serious form of credit difficulty. However, the combined data are
less subject to erratic sampling variations and also eliminate the tendency, in this
survey, for offsetting variations to occur between contracts classified as repos-
•sessed and as delinquent. This occurs because contracts recorded as repossessed
undoubtedly were delinquent at an earlier date but are not so recorded (except
in a very few instances). Hence the repossessions in effect remove an equivalent
number of contracts from the delinquent category. Another way to regard the
combined repossession and delinquency rate, therefore, is to say that it repre-
sents a more comprehensive delinquency rate (assuming all repossessions were
initially delinquent).
If, therefore, itis true, as the credit industry has long maintained, that it
scrutinizes carefully the credit records and other pertinent characteristics of the
borrowers to whom itgrants loans involving the lowest initialequity, the
effects show up only in the lowest (under 20 per cent) down payment class,
where in fact the collection experience is somewhat better than in the next
higher class. The explanation for this deviation from the over-all pattern might
lie, at least partially, in the compensatory screening of these prospective bor-
rowers. However, the general pattern suggests that the credit industry does not,
as a rule, offset liberal loan terms with stricter borrower standards. Cf. Chapter 5,
especiallyTable 36, which also suggests that the notion of offsetting the risks
attendant on easy terms with higher standards for borrowers does not generally
hold.
8 For a detailed discussion of the method, see Consumer Instalment Credit, Part
IV, pp. 136—137.Credit Terms and Collection Experience 71
down payment and the contract price were adjusted by the estimated
amount of overallowance on trade-ins. The result gave what the Fed-
eral Reserve termed the "effective" down payment and the "effective"
price. Since the overallowance on trade-ins is subtracted from both the
contract price and the contract down payment to obtain the effective
ratio, the effective down payment ratios are substantially smaller than
the contract ratios (compare the distribution of loans in Table 28, cols.
4 and 7).
The analysis, available only for the personal interview data, sug-
gests that the highest incidence of repossession and delinquency occurs
among loans involving smaller effective down payment ratios. How-
ever, there is no evidence here that "effective down payment" is
more consistently related to collection experience than is the "con-
tract down payment." Indeed, in these data, the contract down pay-
ment is the more effective discriminator. Apparently the overallow-
ance on trade-in can be included without adversely affecting the rela-
tion between down payment and subsequent collection experience.
Columns 11 and 13 in Table 28 pertain to the relation between loan
maturity and subsequent collection experience as revealed by lender
reports and personal interviews, respectively. From the data on lender
reports it appears that loans with shorter maturities have significantly
lower risk of delinquency or repossession. This relation is less clear in
the personal interview sample. Indeed, in the personal interview data,
the longest maturity group (thirty-six months and over) had lower
than average repossession and delinquency rates. How can this be ac-
counted for?
Incomplete coverage of collection difficulties in the personal inter-
view sample may be partly responsible. The lender reports were evi-
dently much more complete on this score, and hence probably provide
more dependable estimates of the relation of collection, experience to
credit terms. Another factor to be considered in evaluating the per-
formance of the long maturity loans in this survey is that loan ex-
perience was measured only up to the date of the survey and not
through the full life of the loan (unless it had already terminated).
The loans were made in 1954 and 1955, and the survey was taken in
June and July 1956. Thus loans issued in the last month of 1954 were
only eighteen months old at the time of the survey, and loans made in
the last month of 1955 were only six months old. Since during this













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Credit Terms and Collection Experience 73
rapidly (see Table 29, cols. 3—5), the long loans in general would have
been outstanding for a shorter period than the short loans at the date of
the survey. Hence the experience record on long loans would not
only fall to cover their full life but would actually cover a shorter in-
terval than many of the shorter loans made early in the period. Table
29 (cols. 7—9) shows that 47 per cent of all loans for thirty-six months
and over originated within the last six months of the survey period,
according to the lender report sample, while this was true of only 24
per cent of the shortest maturities. This difference might, therefore,
tend to produce fewer cases of delinquency or repossession on the
longer loans.
This inference must be qualified, however, because most collection
difficulties appear in the first few months of the life of a loan, and all
the loans in the survey were at least six months old at the time of the
survey. It may be that delinquency takes longer to develop in long-
maturity as compared with short-maturity loans, but we have no evi-
dence on this point. Moreover, the distribution of long-maturity loans
within the survey period, according to column 9 of the table, seems to
be about the same for both the lender report and personal interview
samples, whereas the low delinquency rates on these loans appeared
only in the personal interview data.
Another possible explanation is that loan experience generally im-
proved between 1954 and 1955 in the course of the recovery from the
195 3—54 recession. Since the long-maturity loans were granted chiefly
in 1955, they were less affected by adverse economic conditions than
the short loans. Again, however, this consideration would apply to
both the lender report and personal interview samples. The upshot is
that we are unable to account for the sharp divergence between the
two samples with respect to the relation between length of maturity
and collection experience, but the pattern revealed by the lender re-
port data is consistent with that shown by all other samples utilized
in this study, namely, poorer collection experience on longer maturity
loans for new cars.
Apart from these considerations having to do with the survey itself,
the relation between repayment experience and loan maturity is com-
plicated by the operation of several factors that have different effects.
One is that longer maturities for a given size loan imply smaller
monthly payments, which, being easier to pay, make delinquency less74 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
TABLE 30
Frequency of Refinancing to Reduce Monthly Payments,




Maturity to Reduce Rate
(months) All Monthly Payments (per cent)
Lender Report Sample .
Less than 18 856 12 1.4
18—23 • 687 21 3.1
24—29 3,021 111 3.7
30—35 3,080 97 3.1
6 and over 1,232 20 1.6
All loans 8,876 261 2.9
Personal interview Sample
Less than18 556 11 2.0
18—23 492 11 2.2
24—29 1,674 59 3.5
30—35 1,597 43 2.7
36 and over 728 6 0.8
All loans 5,047 130 2.6
Source: Unpublished data from the National Analysts Survey of
New Car Purchases for the Federal Reserve Board.
likely. However, as noted earlier and again below, long maturities and
low down payments typically go together, so that the effect of the
longer period in reducing monthly payments is mitigated. Another
factor is that longer maturities mean a longer time for the financial
position of the borrower to change, increasing the possibility of de-
linquency at some time during the life of the loan. Such shifts in
financial circumstances are indicated by the frequency with which
loans are refinanced to reduce monthly payments, which tends to in-Credit Terms and Collection Experience 75
crease,up to a point, with length of maturity (Table 30). A third
factor is that longer maturities mean that it takes longer for the bor-
rower to build up his equity by any given date, making his stake in
fulfilling his contract correspondingly smalier. Apparently these last
two factors generally dominate the result in new-car lending, so that
the longer maturities typically represent greater credit risk.
The Federal Reserve survey of new-car purchases enables us to de-
termine, for the first time, the joint relationship between down pay-
ments and maturities, on the One hand, and subsequent collection ex-
perience, on the other. Unfortunately this can be done only for the
personal interview data, which appear to be less reliable, especially
with respect to maturities, than the lender reports. Nevertheless, it is
clear from Table 31 that within each maturity group, collection
experience improves consistently as the effective down payment per-
centage increases. Also, within a given down payment group, ma-
turities of thirty to thirty-five months experience higher repossession
and delinquency rates than do shorter maturities. The abnormally low
repossession and delinquency rates on loans of thirty-six months or
more also appear consistently, but this result must be heavily dis-
counted for the reasons alluded to earlier.
Table 31 brings out the fact that loans with long maturities are pre-
dominantly low down payment loans, while short maturities much
more frequently involve high down payments. As a result, when only
one of these characteristics is taken into account at a time, its rela-
tionship to collection experience is apt to be exaggerated. To illustrate
the point, in Table 31 the largest number of contracts is in the group
with maturity "under 30 months" and down payment "40 and
over," and the next largest is in the group with maturity "30—35
months" and down payment "under 29." Hence the low delinquency
and repossession rate for the first group (1.0 per cent) dominates the
weighted average rate for all loans with maturities under 30 months
and the high rate for the second group (3.4 per cent) dominates the
average for all loans of 30—35 months. Similarly, the average rate for
all high down payment loans is heavily influenced by the low rate in
9Inhis pamphlet Easy Credit Can be Tough, Thomas W. Rogers of the American
Finance Conference suggests that, with a 25 per cent down payment, maturities
of thirty-six months on the automobile loans he examined result in a situation
in which the customer's debit balance exceeds the wholesale value of the car
for the first twenty months of the contract period.76 Quality of Consumer Instalment Credit
TABLE 31
Collection Experience on Loans Cross -Classified






(mos.) Under 3030—39 over Total
1. Number Of Contracts
Under 30 991 592 1,119 2,702
30—35 1,060 343 187 1,590
36 and over 564 86 72 722




Under 30 3.1 1.6 1.0 1.9 2.1
30—35 3.4 3.2 1.1 2.6 3.1







Source:Unpublished data from the National Analysts
New Automobile Purchase Surveyforthe Federal Reserve
Board.
Note: Contracts that could not be classified because information
was lacking are excluded. The bad loan rate is the total number of
delinquencies and repossessions expressed as a percentage of the
number of contracts in the group. The unweighted averages are based
on the rates in each row (Or column) without taking into account the
number of contracts in the respective row (or column).Credit Terms and Collection Experience 77
the shortest maturity class, and the average for all low down payment
loans is more influenced by the high rate in the 30—35-month class.
The unweighted averages shown in the table represent a crude way of
eliminating much of this joint effect and more nearly approximate the
relationship between each characteristic separately and the measure of
lending experience.
INTERAREA ANALYSIS, 1953—56
The relation between changes in loan terms and subsequent collection
experience can be further studied by means of data provided by a
large sales finance company for twelve metropolitan areas for every
third month from 1953 to April 1956. In 'this analysis we have concen-
trated on the repossession rate related to the date the loan was made as
the best single measure of collection experience.'0
Chart 9 shows how the repossession rate varied with the proportion
of loans with down payments under 33 per cent in each of the years
1953, 1954, and 1955. In each area, for each year, the ultimate repos-
session rates are estimated for the same loans to which the down
payment percentages apply. First, it is fairly clear from the over-all
pattern that between 1953 and 1955 the easing of down payments
in most areas was accompanied by an increase in repossession rates on
the loans made. Second, within each of the three years 1953, 1954, and
1955, the areas with the most liberal down payment requirements had
the poorest repossession experience. Viewed either way, the associa-
tion of low down payments with high repossession rates is moderately
close.
We have observed previously that while down payments and
maturities tend to move together, by and large; down payments seem
to be a clearer indicator of what subsequent collection experience will
be. Chart 10, comparable with Chart 9, relates the percentage of new
automobile loans with maturities of twenty-five months or more to
the estimated repossession rates on the same loans. The over-all posi-
tive association for the three years is clearly visible, but the interarea
association within each of the three periods is considerably less pro-
10Othermeasures of collection experience are considered in Appendix C. The
consequences of using repossession figures arranged by date of repossession in-
stead of by date loan was made are discussed in Appendix F.CHART 9
New-Automobile Contracts with Down Payments Under 33 Per
Cent and Estimated Repossession Rate as of Year of Purchase,
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Souaci: TablesF-2 and F-S. Data from a large salesfinancecompany; 1955 based
on January and April.
CHART 10
New-Automobile Contracts with Maturities 25Monthsor Longer
and Estimated Repossession Rate as of Year of Purchase,
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SouRce:Tables F-3 and F-S. Data from a large sales finance company; 1955
basedon January and April.CHART 11
Used-Automobile Contracts with Down Payments Under 33 Per
Cent and Estimated Repossession Rate as of Year of Purchase,
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CHART 12
Used-Automobile Contracts with Maturities 25' Months or Longer
and Estimated Repossession Rate as of Year of Purchase,
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nounced than with down payments in Chart 9. In short, differences
among areas in loan-maturity distribution in a given year are scarcely
associated at all with differences in their repossession experience on
these loans. This may be due to the fact that the differences in the
maturity distributions within a year were relatively small. In 1953 and
1954, the one area in which terms were spectacularly easier than in the
other eleven areas did have one of the higher repossession rates. In
1955, the two areas that were much more lenient than the rest in the
matter of maturities had high repossession rates.
The data just considered were also analyzed on a quarterly basis
(see Tables F-i, F-2, and F-3). That the general relations between
down payments and ultimate repossession rates, and between maturities
and ultimate repossession rates, are pervasive and fairly consistent was
borne out by the quarterly analysis, although the results were striking
only for those areas with very liberal terms.
Study of the quarterly data suggests that the general lowering of
down payment requirements and lengthening of maturities during the
1953—55 period tended to raise repossession rates, and also that, as a con-
sequence of the business recession of 1954, repossession rates tended
to go up even without any change in loan terms. Chapter 6 will
examine these materials from the latter point of view.
Another facet of the relation between loan terms and ultimate re-
possession experience on automobiles is revealed by examining loans
on used automobiles made by the same sales finance company's branch
offices in the same twelve metropolitan areas (Charts 11, 12, and 13)."
Despite the fact that down payment percentages are about the same
and maturities much shorter on used than on new cars, the estimated
repossession rates on used-auto loans are far higher than those on new-
auto loans (compare Chart 9 with 11, and 10 with 12). Other factors
than credit terms evidently account for these differences in collection
experience—differences that also appear in the other loan samples
1Thedata on down payment and maturities were available separately for
late-model used automobiles and older-model used automobiles, whereas the re-
possession rate data apply to all used autos. Since the late-model used automobiles
made up the bulk of the volume involved and hence are likely to be the major
contributor to the used-automobile repossessions, the terms on late models are
used here. Inclusion of the older model figures would tend to make the terms
less liberal since more liberal provisions prevail on the higher-priced more recent
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considered in the section "Conspectus of Evidence from the 1920's to
the 1950's" in this chapter.
Chart 11 shows a modest tendency for the highest repossession rates
to be associated with the greatest percentage of low-down-payment
loans on used autos. But many areas with a high percentage of low-
down-payment paper experienced repossession rates no higher than
those with a low percentage.
Chart 12 reveals, like the national data considered earlier, that longer
maturities in used-automobile loans are associated with lower repos-
session rates. This appears clearly in the 1954 figures and to some
extent in 1955. In 1953, so few loans were made for twenty-five
months or longer that the figures are not very meaningful. However,
when a different grouping, eighteen months and over, is used for that
year (Chart 13), the inverse relation between maturities and repos-
sessions appears clearly. Thus the area data do not suggest that a
lengthening of maturities on used-automobile loans typically leads to
higher repossession rates, as in the case of new-automobile loans. In
used-automobile loans other factors evidently offset the greater risks
that longer maturities usually entail.
CHART 13
Late Model Used-Automobile Contracts with Maturity over 18
Months and Estimated Repossession Rate as of Year of
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In sum, a partial answer is possible to the question posed at the be-
ginning of this chapter. Credit terms do seem to be significantly
lated to subsequent collection experience. Utilizing data covering in
varying degree the period since 1925, we can conclude that high down
payment ratios have been consistently associated with a smaller degree
of subsequent collection difficulty on both new- and used-automobile
credit. Shorter maturities on new automobile paper also have been as-
sociated with better subsequent collection experience, though some-
what less strongly than down payments. In the case of contracts on
used automobiles the maturity relationship is reversed.
Moreover, we find these general tendencies strikingly visible when
collection experience is recorded for loans cross-classified by both
down payment ratio and by maturity. This enables us to consider the
effect of each aspect of the credit contract, holding the other constant,
as well as the combined effect of an easing or tightening in both. We
find that down payments and maturities typically reinforce rather than
offset each other in their effects on subsequent collection experience.